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Promotingsafety through workers' compensation:
the efficacy and net wage costs of injuryinsurance
Michael J. Moore*
and
W. Kip Viscusi*

*

This article explores the effects of workers'compensation on fatality rates and wages using
the 1982 Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the new occupationalfatality data issued by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The fatality rate depends upon
the workers'compensation benefitvariablesin a manner that suggests that the safety incentive
effects of higher insurance premiums offset any moral hazard effects. The estimates imply
that in the absence of workers' compensation, fatality rates would increase by over 20%.
Premium levels substantially overstate the cost of workers'compensation, due primarily to
a direct wage offsetfrom higher benefits.An indirect wage offset resultingfrom the decrease
in risk caused by workers'compensation augments the direct wage effects. The indirect ofset
is relatively small, equalling about 10% of the total.
1. Introduction
* The fundamental interdependence of job risks and wages has been a focal point of the
labor economics literature dealing with nonpecuniary job characteristics. Higher levels of
risk cause workers to demand higher wages, and these wage-risktrade-offs,in turn, establish
market incentives for safety.' The introduction of workers' compensation establishes an
additional dimension. Higher levels of workers' compensation benefits should dampen the
wage premiums for risk demanded by the workers, and the funding mechanism for workers'
compensation should provide incentives for safety.2
* Fuqua School of Business, Duke University
* * Duke University

An earlier version of this article was presented at Northwestern University and at Duke University. The
comments provided by the seminar participants and the comments provided by Gary Zarkin, Alvin Klevorick,
James Poterba, and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Viscusi's researchwas supported by the
endowment of the George G. Allen chair at Duke University, and Moore's research was supported in part by the
Business Associates Fund at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
' See, for example, Brown ( 1980), Thaler and Rosen ( 1976), and Viscusi ( 1979, 1983). Also, see the reviews
by Bailey ( 1980) and Rosen ( 1986).
2 The overall structure of workers' compensation benefits is no doubt endogeneous, but state legislatures
modify these programs so infrequently that this complication can be ignored for the time period covered by most
data bases.
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A key economic and regulatoryissue pertains to the efficacy of different compensation
mechanisms in promoting safety. The primary market mechanism of compensating differentials creates substantial incentives for safety. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) providesan additional institutional mechanism for the direct regulation
of risks. OSHA policies have failed to fulfill their initial promise, however, as observed safety
effects are statistically significant, but of small magnitude.3
Some economists advocate using an injury tax approach similar to the funding mechanism for workers' compensation as a substitute for regulatory policies.4 In theory this
approachcould enhance safety levels; however, most formal statisticalevidence documenting
the workers' compensation-safety linkage indicates that the opposite is true-that the moral
hazard effects dominate and that the increased benefits therefore lead to greaterinjury rates.5
In the case of compensating differentials, we have a dollar price tag in terms of risk
premiums paid. This is also true of workers' compensation. However, we do not as yet have
a definitive estimate of the ultimate safetyeffect of workers'compensation. Because premiums
are not always fully experience rated, particularly for small firms, and because moral hazard

problems may exist, the extent of the safety incentive effect of workers' compensation is
not clearcut.6
One key to understandingthe relationshipbetween workers'compensation and accidents
lies in the severity of the accidents considered. The majority of existing studies (Chelius,
1982; Chelius and Smith, 1987; Butler and Worral, 1983; Worral and Butler, 1985; Ruser,
1985; Krueger, 1988) have used a risk measure based largely on nonfatal accident rates, on
some composite of fatal and nonfatal rates, or on measures of claims filed for nonfatal and
fatal accidents. These studies all reached the same conclusion-that increased insurance
benefits cause injury and claim rates to rise significantly.
This result reflects an obvious limitation of injury rate and claim data. That is, risk
measures such as total injury rates or lost workday case rates include claims for injuries
that may not, in fact, have occurred. This fact has led most researchers to conclude that
moral hazard effects dominate the safety effects of injury insurance. Furthermore, it makes
it impossible to distinguish whether there is any safety effect at all.
Evidence contrary to this finding is limited. However, it appears that when the risk
measure more accurately captures the severity of accidents, benefit increases have a negative
effect on risk levels for more severe risks. For example, Chelius (1976) found that the
introduction of workers' compensation in the United States led to a decrease in fatality
rates over the period 1900-1940. Chelius (1982) also found a significantnegative relationship
between benefit levels and lost workdays per case, a risk measure that varies with the severity
of the injury.
This general result-that benefit increases increase the incidence of less severe accidents
but decreasetheir severity-provides our motivation in this article.The most severe accidents
should reflect very little moral hazard. Deaths cannot be falsely claimed, of course, and the
high values that workers implicitly attach to the lives saved suggest that workers are not
willing to substitute fatality benefits for their own lives. Therefore, if workers' compensation
provides any safety incentives to firms, these will be reflected most strongly in the fatality
rate data.
The primary objective of this article is, therefore, to assess the performance of workers'
compensation in reducing fatality rates. Our estimates indicate a dramatic safety effect,
3 See Viscusi (1986) and the references contained therein for an assessment of OSHA's impact on safety.
4 See, in particular, Smith (1976), Diamond (1977), and Viscusi (1983). Chelius (1976) and Fishback

(1987) have examined the effects of changing from a negligence standard to a strict liability standard, such as
workers' compensation.
5 See, for example, Chelius (1977, 1982), Butler (1983), Ruser (1985), and Krueger and Burton (1989).
6 Chelius and Smith (1987) and Ruser (1985) have explored the role of experience rating in determining
costs and safety levels.
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particularly when compared with the evidence regarding the impact of OSHA and the
previous evidence on the effects of workers' compensation on nonfatal injuries. A related
issue that we consider is the net dollar cost to firms of responding to these safety incentives.
Examining the dollar premiums for workers' compensation is a useful starting point for
such analyses; it does not, however, give a complete measure of the financial incentives,
since workerswill accept a wage reduction in return for the insurance coverage. Furthermore,
if greater safety is promoted by workers' compensation, the required compensating wage
differential for risk and the level of injury costs to the firm will both be reduced. Thus,
workers' compensation has both direct and indirect effects on workers' wages, and these
effects offset both the cost of the insurance premiums and the employer's expenditures on
safety.
Our analysis extends the researchon the labor market effects of workers' compensation
in two important ways: it analyzes the joint determination of wages and risks in a structural
hedonic model, and it computes the total effect of benefits on wages by taking the indirect
effect into account. Our focus on fatality rates to minimize moral hazard problems is
also new.
A stylized summary of our findings is as follows: increases in fatality rates increase
wages, while increases in workers' compensation benefits lower both wages and fatality
rates. This risk reduction, in turn, has an additional wage effect, equal to about 10%of the
direct benefit effect.
The general spirit of these results is to document the constructive economic functions
served by workers' compensation. These findings run counter to the consensus in the literature as summarized on page 197 of the 1987 Economic Report of the President: "A
growing body of research has found that workers' compensation benefits have unfavorable
effects on safety. Higher benefits appear to increase both the frequency of work injuries and
the number of compensation claims filed." In contrast, our results indicate that workers'
compensation generates truly dramatic reductions in workplace fatalities.

2. Overview

of the economic

relationships

* Our empirical analysis focused on two equations-a risk equation and a wage equation.
Neither of our equations was unprecedented in the literature, although they had typically
been analyzed separately.7All of the variables of interest in the fatality rate (risk) equation
are related theoretically to workers' compensation. The funding mechanism for workers'
compensation createssafety incentives for firms that should increasethe safety level provided.
Even for relatively small firms that are not perfectly experience rated, the insurance underwriting procedures should lead to some link between workplace conditions and insurance
premiums.
A potentially offsetting influence is that of moral hazard, as more generous benefit
levels lead workers to decrease their levels of care. This aspect of worker behavior is just as
unambiguous theoreticallyas the opposite safety incentive effect for employers. Furthermore,
a number of studies have indicated that more generous benefits lead to more extended
periods of recovery and to the possible overreporting of injuries.8 These abuses are likely
to be more responsive to the benefit level than to the fatality rate, which is the subject of
this study. Although one cannot rule out the possibility of a dominant moral hazard effect
on theoretical grounds, the high estimated value of life that workers receive through wagerisk trade-offs suggests that workers would not endanger their lives to a substantial degree
to receive a more generous ex post compensation that will benefit their surviving heirs. In
addition, a worker's ability to report a fatality when one has not occurred is obviously quite
7 Butler ( 1983) and Garen ( 1988) are exceptions to this.
See Butler and Worral ( 1983, 1985), Kniesner and Leeth ( 1989, 1988), and Krueger ( 1988).
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limited. Our working hypothesis was that higher benefits lower fatality risk levels; therefore,
the workers' compensation variable was expected to have a negative sign in the fatality rate
equation.
The second variable of interest-the square of the workers' compensation variablepertains to the nonlinearity of the effect of workers' compensation on fatality rates. This
relationship is highly complex once all feedback effects, such as moral hazard, are taken
into account. We therefore included a quadratic term to capture the nonlinearities.
The third workers' compensation variable captures the interaction between workers'
compensation and firm size. The cost of an accident to a firm in terms of increased insurance
premiums depends crucially on the degree to which firms are experience rated.9Large firms,
particularly those that self-insure, will be rated according to their own accident experience
and feel the full impact of accidents on their insurance premiums. Thus, the safety incentives
should be greater in larger firms.10
The variables included in the wage equation represent less complex influences. Wages
should increase with the risk level, following Adam Smith's proposition that hazardousjobs
will command compensating differentials. For economically similar reasons, higher levels
of workers' compensation should lead to a wage reduction; ex post compensation for job
risks should decrease the level of ex ante compensation required. The extent of the offset
depends on the attractiveness of the insurance provided, which is determined by factors
such as the degree of insurance loading and the risk level.

3. The sample

and the variables

* Our primary data source in this study was the University of Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal survey of worker characteristicsand
their employment experiences beginning in the year 1968. Our analysis focused on the 1982
wave of the data. We selected the 1982 wave of the PSID because it provided the detail
necessary to enable a precise matching of our primary variables of interest-the job risk
and workers' compensation variables-to the sample members. The time period covered
by this wave of the survey was the most appropriatefor the risk measure that we used. The
PSID data have been used in previous applications of the compensating differential model,
such as Viscusi (1979), Moore and Viscusi (1988a, 1988b, 1989, forthcoming), and Viscusi
and Moore (1989).
The PSID data contain two subsamples. One includes a group of workers who were
selected because their incomes fell below a specified poverty standard;the other consists of
randomly selected individuals. To preserve the representativenessof our data, we excluded
the poverty subsample. Our 1982 PSID subsample, which measures labor market outcomes
for 1981, contains 1,173 observations after the exclusion of farmers and farm managers,
workers who are not household heads, government employees (for whom no risk data were
available), and cases with missing data. The sample is broadly representativeof the working
population, considering these exclusions. Table 1 defines the variables used in the empirical
analysis and summarizes their means and standard deviations.
The primary focus of our empirical analysis was on the interrelationshipsamong wages,
hazardous working conditions, firm size, and insurance for job-related injuries. Because the
PSID data does not include information on job risks, workers' compensation benefits, or
firm size, we collected these measures from external published sources and matched the
information to workers in the PSID.
The death risk data, which first became available in 1987, consist of data collected by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as part of its ongoing
9 Ruser ( 1985) discussed these rating practices in detail.
'0 Chelius and Smith ( 1987) analyzed the combined role of compliance costs and premiums and found that
costs per dollar of loss are U-shaped with respect to size. Our analysis provides empirical evidence on the total sizesafety relationship below.

MOORE AND VISCUSI
TABLE 1

/

503

Sample Characteristics
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)

RISK
WCMAX
SIZE
WAGE
FEMALE
BLACK
KIDS
MARRIED
HEALTH

EDUCA TION
EXPERIENCE
JOB TENURE
UNION
BLUE COLLAR

6.61
(8.54)
239.58
(80.65)
44.02
(75.74)
485.74
(215.97)
0.17
(0.38)
0.08
(0.27)
1.00
(1.15)
0.71
(0.45)
0.07
(0.26)
12.92
(2.51)
11.74
(10.53)
5.08
(6.28)
0.30
(0.46)
0.55
(0.50)

Variable Definitions
NTOF risk variable. Number of fatal accidents per 100,000
workers in the worker's industry on a state-specific basis.
Maximum benefit level for temporary total disability under
state workers' compensation program.
Firm size variable:Number of workers by state and
industry.
Computed weekly wage in 1981.
Sex dummy variable: 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise.
Race dummy variable: 1 if worker is black, 0 otherwise.
Number of dependent children.
Marital status dummy variable: 1 if worker has ever been
married, 0 otherwise.
Health status dummy variable: 1 if worker has a serious
physical or nervous condition that limits the amount of
work he can do, 0 otherwise.
Number of grades completed.
Years worked full-time since age 18.
Years worked on current job.
Union status dummy variable: 1 if worker'sjob is covered
by a collective bargainingagreement, 0 otherwise.
Collar-color dummy variable: 1 if worker is in a blue-collar
occupation, 0 otherwise.

National Traumatic Occupational Fatality (NTOF) project. The NIOSH initiated the NTOF
study to provide a more accurate assessment of fatality risks and, as a by-product, to reconcile
differences in existing sources of risk data-primarily the occupational fatality data provided
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the National Safety Council (NSC), and the
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The discrepancies in the perspectives on job
risks provided by these sources are large. In 1984, for instance, the estimated numbers of
fatalities in the BLS, NSC, and NCHS data were 3,750, 11,500, and 4,960, respectively,
while the NTOF five-year average for the period 1980-1984 was approximately 7,000 fatalities per year. Some of the discrepancies can be explained by differences in the coverage
of each survey. The NSC, for instance, is the only source that includes government workers,
small firms, and self-employed individuals. It is doubtful, however, that inclusion of these
omitted groups would triple the BLS death rate and thus bring it more into line with the
NSC estimate.
The NTOF data have a major advantage for any study of workers' compensation, since
they are available by state, which is the degree of disaggregation that is required to sensibly
analyze the state-run workers' compensation programs. Previously published risk data do
not reflect state differences, creating potentially serious comparability problems."' Using
" In those studies that have analyzed the impact of workers' compensation on injury rates, Butler ( 1983)
used time series data on risks and benefits within a single state (South Carolina) to circumvent this problem. Chelius
(1982) used unpublished data on two-digit (SIC) manufacturing industries for 36 states, and Ruser (1985) used
unpublished BLS injury data for 25 three-digit manufacturing industries across 41 states. Of the three studies, only
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the national level BLS risk data to analyze the relationship between wages and insurance
benefits creates an obvious source of error, since the national risk data ignore interstate
variation in risks within industries.12The sampling error inherent in the BLS survey and
the interindustry risk variation lost as a consequence of aggregationcreate substantial measurement error problems.
The NTOF data are not plagued by these same problems. Fatality rates in the currently
available data were constructed from a census of occupational fatalities during the years
1980-1984 and are classified by state and industry. As a consequence, there is no sampling
error due to survey techniques, and both interstate and interindustry risk variations are
captured by the data. One limitation of the NTOF data base is that it does not provide
information on nonfatal injury rates.
Since the NTOF data have only recently been released, the implications of the new
risk data for our understanding of the role of job risks in the labor market have not yet
been fully explored. The first study to compare the implications of using the NTOF data
rather than the BLS data is Moore and Viscusi (1988b). This research indicates that there
exists a substantial amount of measurement error across industries in the BLS data and
that using the BLS data lowers the estimated value of life by over one-half. Furthermore,
in all of the wage equation specifications we tested for this study, the NTOF data yielded
much stronger statistical results.
The second key variable we used is the measure of workers' compensation benefits.
Previous analyses have utilized a range of measures, including the weekly wage replacement
rate (Viscusi and Moore, 1987; Moore and Viscusi, 1988b, 1989; Chelius, 1982; Arnould
and Nichols, 1983), weekly benefits (Ruser, 1985), annual payments by industry (Butler,
1983), and workers' compensation premium rates (Dorsey and Walzer, 1983). In most
cases, benefits for the most frequent type of claim-temporary total disabilities-have been
used as a proxy for all types of benefits, including those for temporary total, permanent
total, and permanent partialdisabilities,and for fatalitybenefits. Butler, however, did attempt
to separately identify the effects of each type of benefit with some success and constructed
a benefit index using principal components analysis. Viscusi and Moore (1987) documented
the high correlations among the various benefit categories that make separation of their
effects difficult. We based the benefit measure used here on the temporary total disability
category.
State workers' compensation benefits are determined by a formula that specifies both
a minimum benefit amount and a benefit cap. If two-thirds of the worker's pretax wage
falls between these limits, the benefits paid equal two-thirds of the wage. The averagepretax
wage replacement rate in our sample is lower than .67, since many workers' wages exceeded
the cap.'3 Because of their mechanical dependence upon the wage, specific measures of an
individual's workers' compensation benefits create endogeneity problems in the estimation
of wage and risk equations. In previous wage equation studies, instrumental variables estimation has been used to solve this problem.14

Butler attempted to analyze the combined impact of benefits on both injury rates and wages. Butler's results are
not conclusive however, and the restrictedscope of the South Carolina data limits the generalizabilityof his results.
12 In the NTOF data, the average risks within one-digit SIC industry classifications are typically two to five
times the size of their standard errors, so the interstate risk variation is more pronounced for some industries than
for others.
13 Workers who qualified for the minimum benefit constitute a small portion of the sample ( 1%). We treated
these workersas if they were above the minimum for estimation purposes. We attempted to add a switching variable
similar to the variable d, but it was not possible to estimate a first-stageprobit equation to construct the selectivity
variable corresponding to workers whose wage put them below the minimum benefit level. Even the simplest
models, containing only a few of the variables in the probit equations described in the text, did not work.
14 Butler ( 1983) and Garen ( 1988) used primarily instrumental variables to estimate the risk equations in
their studies.
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As an alternative, in this study we focused our attention on the role that changes in
benefit ceilings (WCMAX) play in the determination of fatality risks. This approach has
two desirable features. First, the benefit ceiling is one of the key workers' compensation
policy variables and varies widely across states. Second, benefit ceilings are set by state
boards and are less likely to be endogenous in the risk and wage equations.
The benefit ceiling will affect wage and risk levels of all workers when each worker's
weekly wage is uncertain. In this case, increases in benefit ceilings increase the spread of
potential benefits. Furthermore, increases in benefit ceilings are typically accompanied by
increases in benefit floors. Consequently, benefit ceilings act as a proxy for ex ante expected
benefits, and increases in these ceilings will benefit all workers. It is likely, however, that
variations in the ceiling will have a larger effect for workers for whom the ceiling acts as a
constraint. We allowed for these differences by estimating a switching regression model,
where the switching variable is defined as
if
di =

1

0o

(2/ 3) WAGEi2 WCMAXi

if not.

We describe the risk and insurance variables that were our principal focus at the top
of Table 1. The variable RISK is the average number of fatalities per 100,000 workers for
the years 1980-1984, as measured by the NIOSH. The overall fatality rate in our sample
of 6.6 deaths per 100,000 workers is approximately 30%higher than the BLS death rate for
this period. The benefit ceiling variable, WCMAX, equals the maximum benefit level for
which the worker qualifies, based on weekly insurance benefits for temporary total disability
as reported annually by the United States Chamber of Commerce (1982). We matched the
RISK variable to workers by their reported state and industry and matched WCMAX
by state.
The third variable that we collected externally is the firm size variable, SIZE. Since
the PSID data does not include such a measure, we matched average firm size data from
United States Department of Commerce (1984) to workers in the sample by state and onedigit industry. Workers in the transportation, utilities and sanitary services, and the finance,
insurance, and real estate industries were excluded from our sample in the matching process
because size data were not available for these industries.
A secondary issue is the use of state dummy variables as regressorsin the risk equation.
State dummies were used by Ruser (1985) and Krueger (1988) to control for interstate
differences in the types of injuries that firms are required to report. The inclusion of state
dummies makes it difficult to estimate the workers' compensation effects, however, since
these vary primarily by state. Fortunately, this problem did not arise for the risk variable
considered here. Firms in all states must report on-the-job fatalities, and the definition of
what constitutes a fatality is certainly clear-cut.
The primary measure of pecuniary compensation that we used is the worker's weekly
wage (WAGE) for 1981, the year covered by the 1982 PSID data. The explanatory variables
in the WAGEequations consist of a group of measures representingpersonal characteristics,
location measures, and characteristicsof the worker'sjob, including the job risk and workers'
compensation. Personal background variables include the worker's sex (FEMALE dummy
variable) and race (BLACK dummy variable). Although these variables primarily reflect
tastes, they can also represent the effects of market discrimination or the effects of worker
traits that are unobservable to the firm, but are correlated with these characteristics. The
human capital variables are standard for wage equation studies and reflect productivity
limitations (HEALTH), years of formal schooling (EDUCATION), and acquired training
that is either general (EXPERIENCE) or specific (JOB TENURE) in nature. We included
state dummy variables as indicators of interstate wage differentialsdue to differences in the
cost of living and local labor market demand conditions. The job variables available in the
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PSID data set include a dummy variablefor the worker'scollective bargainingstatus ( UNION
dummy variable) and the collar-color dummy variable (BLUE COLLAR) that indicates
whether a worker is in a blue-collar occupation. This latter variable captures the role of
omitted job characteristicsthat are correlated with blue-collar occupations.

4. Estimation

procedure

* To determine the effect of the benefit maximum on fatality risk levels, we regressedthe
variableRISK on the three benefit variables, WCMAX, WCMAX2,and (WCMAX)(SIZE).
We also included industry dummy variables and SIZE as control variables in the vector
XR.*5 The RISK equations estimated are
RISKi = at'XRi + a4WCMAX, +

'bbWCMAX? + oa',(WcMAXi)(SIZEi)

+ E1

(1 )

and
RISKoi = a'XRi + acgWCMAXi+ aobbWCMAX + ac (WCMAXi)(SIZEi) + 0oi, (2)
where the indicators 1 and 0 identify whether the worker is above or below the benefit
ceiling.
Consistent estimates of the parameters in equations (1) and (2) require that
E[Elil di = 1] = E[coil di = O] = 0.

As shown by Heckman (1979), Maddala (1983), and others, these expectations equal
E[EliI di = 1] =-o-.i
and
E[coi I di = 0] = couXoi,

where
_

q(y'Zi)
4,(-YZi)

and
(-I

i

'Zi)

and where 4i and (Didenote the standard normal density and distribution functions. The
covariance terms, oju, represent the covariances between the Ejiand the normalized error
term, u, in the reduced form selection equation:
Prob[d = 1] = Prob[(2/3)WAGE=

Prob[--y'Z

WCMAX 2 0]

&lt;
u].

Candidates for variables to include in the vector Z include any variables that cause
variation in either the wage or in the maximum benefit level. However, since the wage is
endogenous in the risk equation, any variable that is not independent of the individual,
specificcomponent of the wage does not qualify as an instrumentalvariable.Consequentially,
we focused our attention on variablesthat cause variation in WCMAXinstead. In particular,
we used a model developed by Danzon ( 1988) that explains the variation in WCMAX and,
therefore, in d. Our instruments in the probit equation included the percentage of the
" The industry categories include mining, construction, manufacturing, communication, wholesale trade,
retail trade, and services. The services dummy was excluded for estimation purposes.

MOOREAND VISCUSI /

507

residentsin each state whose age is less than 65 years, the percentageof blacks, the percentage
of females, and the percentage of those with less than 12 years of schooling as demographic
mix variables. The percentage of firms with more than 100 employees, the percentage of
firms with less than 20 employees, and the percentage of workers in each one-digit industry
served as industrial mix variables. We took these as our minimal instrument set (i.e., the
set of instrumental variables in which we had the most faith) and experimented with adding
other variables that affect WCMAX in order to increase the precision of our estimates. Our
final instrument set included variables representing the individual worker's number of dependent children and marital status and a regional dummy variable for the southeast, in
addition to the minimal set. We assumed that these variables are exogeneous with respect
to risk in the sense that if the proportion of any one of the demographic mix variables or
any one of the industrial mix variables within a state should change, then there should be
no change in the underlying riskiness of the job that is not accounted for by the exogenous
variables in the risk equation.
To test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we estimated an alternative
RISK equation in which the variablesin Z were included as regressors.The results discussed
below, which are based on RISK equations with the Z variables excluded, are not sensitive
to the exclusion restrictions, particularly in the In RISK equation, where the signs and
significance levels remain unchanged. Furthermore, the main findings discussed below also
survive the relaxation of this restriction when RISK is converted to the log-odds form.
We therefore estimated the equations
RISKi,

= oa'lXRi + caWCMAXi + a bWCMAXi

i

(3)

+ ag( WCMAXi)(SIZEi) + aouXoi+ Eo,

(4)

+ a4s(WCMAXi)(SIZEi) - aluli +

e

and
+ a
RISKoi = a'cXRi + o1WCMAX bWCMAX

where Xjiwas estimated in a first-stageprobit equation.
Combining equations (3) and (4) yields the single RISK equation
RISKi = a'XRi + (a' - ac)XRi,i

+ a4WCMAXii

+ abbWCMAX2 Ii + aobWCMAX(1

+ acWCMAX(

- (Ii)+

+ ca,s(WCMAXi)(SIZEi)(1

1 --i)

a, (WCMAXi)(SIZEi) ,i
- 4i) + (aou - au)ki

+ E*.

(5)

Combining equations (3) and (4) in this manner allows a test of the restriction
al = a'b. If this restriction is not rejected, its imposition increases the efficiency of the
estimation, giving more precise estimates of the workers' compensation effects.16On the
other hand, the standard errors estimated in equation (5) are suspect, since estimation of
a single, combined equation such as this imposes the restriction that the variances of the
error terms in equations (3) and (4) be equal. We adjusted the standard error estimates by
using the formula in Maddala (1983) to correct for this problem.
As discussed in Section 2, our hypothesized effects of workers' compensation on RISK
were aC < 0, abb > 0, and acK < 0. If moral hazard offsets the safety incentive effect, the
net effect of workers' compensation will be to raise the fatality risk. Our results therefore provide a direct test of the net incentive effect of workers' compensation. Based
upon our interpretation of WCMAX as a proxy for expected benefits, we also expected
I\l, > °IkC for k = b, bb, bs.
16

betweenthesecoefficientswhenthe modelswereestimatedseparately.
Therewereno significantdifferences
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5. RISK equation

estimates

* Table 2 presents least squares estimates of the RISK and in RISK equations described
above. The coefficient estimates reported represent the coefficients multiplied by b or
( 1- () to facilitatethe comparison of the effectsbetween workersabove and below the maximum. The variable SELECTIVITY denotes the Mill's ratio variable. The total effects of
the key explanatory variables are presented at the bottom of Table 2.
The results given in Table 2 indicate that workers' compensation serves on balance as
a safety incentive mechanism. The WCMAX variable has a negative sign and very strong
statistical significance in all four cases, indicating a large negative benefit impact on fatality
levels. The nonlinearity of the WCMAX effect is also very strong, as evidenced by the
significant positive coefficients for WCMAX2. The negative effect of (WCMAX)(SIZE),
which is statistically significant in the RISK equation for workers above or below the maximum, indicates that rating firms more in line with their experience serves to reinforce the
dampening effect of workers' compensation on risks. Furthermore, the (WCMAX)(SIZE)
interaction is jointly significant with the SIZE variable in both equations. The total SIZE
effect is negative in both cases, which is consistent with the previous findings in the literature.
Both economies of scale in the production of safety and experience rating exert downward
pressure on risk levels.
The finding that workers' compensation benefits exert a significant negative effect on
fatality rates in unprecedented in the literature. Of the major studies that have identified
TABLE 2

Estimates of the Risk Equations Coefficients
and Standard Errors
Dependent Variable
RISK

Coefficient (Variable)a
a,(SIZE)
(WCMAXId

b

1)

=

a4(WCMAXI d = 0)
abb(WCMAX2Id
abb(

= 1)

WCMAXId= 0)

0.012
(0.009)

-1.14E-3*

-1.26E-2**

-2.56E-3**

(0.50E-2)
-0.78E-2**
(0.31 E-2)

-1.47E-3**

ebs((WCMAX)(SIZE)

Id = 0)

(o2u

-aJ)(SELECTIVITY)

R2

=

1)

(0.55E-3)
(0.38E-3)
3.52E-6**

(1.01 E-5)

(1.07E-6)

1.54E-5*

Id

(0.70E-3)

2.03E-5**

(0.81 E-5)
abs((WCMAX)(SIZE)

In RISK

-4.15E-5*

(2.51 E-5)
-2.27E-5*
(1.26E-5)
7.197*
(4.136)
0.769

2.56E-6**

(1.23E-6)
-1.67E-6
(2.66E-6)
-1.14E-6

(1.42E-6)
1.364**
(0.453)
0.702

Total Effects of Explanatory Variablesb
-6.09E-3

WCMAX

x2(WCMAX,df

= 3)

SIZE

x2(SIZE,df = 2)

-8.40E-3

16.9**

42.5**

-3.41E-3

-1.81E-3
107.7**

10.5**

* Statistically significant at the 5%confidence level, one-tailed test.

** Statistically significant at the 1%confidence level, one-tailed test.
Also included as control variables were seven industry dummy variables.
b
Evaluated at the sample means.

a
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statistically significant effects, Chelius (1982) found a positive relationship between benefits
and injury frequencies and Ruser (1985) found the same relationship between benefits and
injuries that resulted in lost workday cases. Likewise, Butler and Worral (1985) found a
positive effect of benefits on the claims rate for temporary total disabilities. Most recently,
Krueger (1988) found a positive relationship between benefits and participation rates for
workers' compensation programs, except for female workers. On the other hand, Chelius
also found a negative relationship between benefits and injury severity as measured by total
lost workdays, and Krueger and Burton found no relationship between workers' compensation costs and injury rates.
The most likely reason why our results run counter to those in the literature appears
to be the nature of the risk variable. There are two aspects of moral hazard reflected in the
injury rate studies-reduced care and the filing of spurious claims. The available evidence
indicates that the latter effect can be substantial. Butler and Worral (1983, 1985) have
documented a positive effect of benefits on both the filing of claims and their duration, and
Smith (1989) has found that a large number of claims for sprains and strains occur on
Monday mornings, which suggeststhat workers might postpone treatment for some injuries
sufferedat home in order to qualify for benefits. For two reasons, it is not likely that reduced
care or the filing of false claims is reflected in our data. Evidence on workers implicit
valuations of life suggests that increases in the risk of death are not adequately compensated
for by increased benefits. More importantly, the ability to file a false claim is severely limited
for fatalities.
Another important difference in our risk variable is the process by which the NTOF
data were collected. Since the NTOF data represent a census of fatalities on the job, they
are not subject to the sampling errorthat is inherent in the risk data collected by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and other agencies. Evidence presented by Moore and Viscusi (1988b)
indicates that this erroris not entirely random, which may also help to explain the differences
in our results.

6. Wage equation

estimates

* The main result of the preceding section, i.e., that workers' compensation benefits exert
strong downward pressure on injury rates, identifies a third linkage in the wage-risk-benefit
model. The majority of the empirical research on wage-risk and wage-benefit trade-offs
indicates that increases in job risks cause wages to rise, while increases in workers' compensation benefits generate wage reductions.'7 To the extent that benefit increases cause
risks to fall, these previous analyses have understatedthe estimates of the wage-benefittradeoff by ignoring the indirect effect of benefits on wages through risks.
To explore the complete wage-risk-benefitmodel, we used the estimated risk-benefit
trade-offs from Table 2 in conjunction with a standard compensating differential wage
equation. Again, we estimated switching equations for workers above and below the maximum. Combining the wage equations yields
WAGEi = O'Xwi + ('l -1o)Xwibi

+ bRRISKibi + ° RISK, (1 - bi) + b(RISKi)

X (WCMAXi)(b + bb(RISKi)(WCMAXi)(1 - Ii) + (2u - au)+ki + V*.

(6)

The control variables in the vector Xw included state dummy variables, years of job tenure,
experience, and education, SIZE, number of dependents, marital, health, and union status
dummy variables, and the blue-collar occupation dummy variable. Squared values of job
tenure and experience were also included.

17See, for example, Viscusi and Moore (1987).
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State dummies were included in the wage equation to control for differences in the
cost of living and in labor market conditions across states. The remaining control variables
are standardin wage equations. We did not use a measure of city size in the results reported,
since it was never close to statistically significant; its exclusion did not alter the results.
The coefficients in equation (6) should have the signs:
> 0;

Rj?30

3

L0

&lt;
0;

Ib JI > labI.

and

These coefficients, in conjunction with those in equation (5), can then be used to compute
the effect of an increase in WCMAX on WAGE. This effect equals
~~WAGE
=
A9WCMAX

R

9RISK
AR

~RS

a WCMAX

+ 6b( 1 - 41)]RISK

+ [63
=

+ 60 1 -4~))WCMAX]
b

4~+ R0 1I- 4~ + (64b

+

a9WCMAX

(7)

AbRISK.

Using equation (5), we obtain
B9RISK
a WCMAX=

ahl + a0( 1 - 4) +
+ (a

= ab

4 + A (1

-

2(a

bb 4 + a bb(I -

)) WCMAX

4))SIZE

+ abbWCMAX+ absSIZE.

(8)

Combining equations (7) and (8) gives
aWAGE

d WCMAX

-

AR(ab

+ abbWCMAX+

absSIZE)+ AbRISK.

(9)

Previous estimates of wage-benefit trade-offs ignored the indirect effect represented by the
first term in equation (9). If increases in the benefit ceiling reduce fatality rates, as indicated
in Table 2, these previous findings understated the size of the trade-off, given AR > 0.
Estimates of 9RISK/I WCMAX can be computed using the coefficients presented in
Table 2. Using the estimates in either Column 1 or 2, we can see that a one dollar increase
in WCMAX causes RISK to fall by about .006, when measured at the mean values of
WCMAX ($239.00) and SIZE (44.0). To determine the total wage offset, we need only to
use the estimated parameters of the wage equation.

o Estimates for equation (6). Table 3 presents estimates of the parameters of equation
(6) for a number of different specifications of the dependent variable. In eacif case, preliminary regressions were estimated to test the hypothesis 's = /3g. Since this hypothesis was
never rejected, we constrained these coefficients to be equal. Of these coefficients, we report
only the compensating risk differential, 6R . In each of the equations estimated, bR is positive
and statistically significant at the 1%confidence level. Once again, we corrected the standard
errors to allow for different variances in each regime.
The benefit variables also perform in the expected manner. Increases in the benefit
0). Increases in
ceiling cause wages to fall significantly for workers above the ceiling (63I&lt;
the ceiling also cause wages to fall for workers for whom the maximum is not binding
0) , and the amount of the decrease is less for these workers (I| I| > I63 | ).
(6 b &lt;
Although the 63 coefficients only approach significance at the 5%level, they are always
jointly significant with the 3' coefficients and are significant at the 10%level in Column 3.
This weak effect can be due to one of two things. As hypothesized, it might be the case that
increases in the benefit maximum are not valued by workers whose wages fall below the
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Estimates of the Wage Equations Coefficients and Standard Errors

Coefficient
(Variable)a
SR(RISK)
b6I((RISK)(WCMAX) Id = 1)

WCMAX)Id = 0)
60b((RISK)(
( -2u-a,)(SELECTIVITY)

R2

Weekly
Wage

After-tax
Weekly
Wage

in (Weekly
Wage)

in (After-tax
Weekly
Wage)

5.20**
(1.95)
- 1.22E-2*
(0.57E-2)
-0.40E-2
(0.32E-2)
-322.85*
(155.87)
0.451

2.66**
(1.08)
-5.69E-3*
(3.19E-3)
-4.62E-3
(3.85E-3)
-192.19*
(86.86)
0.411

1.12E-2**
(0.42E-2)
-2.45E-5*
(1.14E-5)
-0.98E-5
(0.64E-5)
-0.609*
(0.336)
0.465

8.13E-3**
(3.55E-3)
-1.73E-5*
(0.97E-5)
-0.71 E-5
(0.SSE-5)
-0.595*
(0.284)
0.41

Statistically significant at the 5%confidence level, one-tailed test.

*

* Statistically significant at the 1%confidence level, one-tailed test.
a Also included as explanatory variables were measures of the worker's sex, race, marital status, number of
dependent children, health status, education, experience, job tenure, union status, firm size, and state dummy
variables.

maximum. Alternatively, the lack of significance may be due to collinearity problems associated with the variables WCMAX4 and WCMAX( 1 - ).
The selectivity coefficients in Table 3 are all negative and significant. Since these coefficients measure the correlation between vji and ui (the unobserved variables in the wage
equation and the selection equation), the negative sign is not surprising: both mu and cou
should be positive due to wealth effects. Empirically, it appearsthat aIu > a2u The selectivity
terms in the RISK equations, which are all positive and significant,also indicate the presence
of wealth effects. Wealthier workerswill buy off some risk and are more likely to have wages
that exceed the maximum; therefore, the error terms in the risk equation and the selection
equation should be negatively related.

7. Implications

for market behavior

* The most important implication of the resultsreportedin Tables 2 and 3 is the perspective
they give on the market effects of workers' compensation that extend beyond the payment
of premiums and compensation. Consider first the safety incentive effect. Although the net
impact of insurance benefits on RISK is theoretically indeterminate, the estimates of the
RISK equations indicate empirically that benefit increases exert considerable pressure on
firms to improve safety levels, thus reducing fatality risk levels. Indeed, using the estimates
from Table 2, if benefits were nonexistent, the average fatality rate would rise by approximately 1.5 deaths per 100,000 workers, or an increase of 22%.18 The Table 2 results also
indicate that benefits exert downward pressure on injury rates that diminishes as benefits
rise. Using the estimates in Column 1 of Table 2, the safety effect continues to dominate
up to a weekly benefit maximum of $325.00, or $375.00 in 1988 prices.19
The second notable result concerns the wage-risk feedback effects of workers' compensation. If benefit increases cause fatalities to fall, as our results indicate, the net wage
savings generated by the wage-benefit trade-off include an indirect effect due to the positive
18

Using the risk-benefit trade-off in Column 2 of Table 2, the total effect of WCMAX on the fatality rate
equals ( -0.0061)(240) = - 1.5 deaths per 100,000 workers. This result assumes that the point estimates are valid
over the entire range of WCMAX, which may not be the case.
'9 Setting aRISK/OWCMAX equal to zero and solving for WCMAX, at the mean SIZE = 44.0, yields this
result. The price inflator used is 1.15.
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relationship between wages and risks. Based on the estimates in the first column of
Table 2, which indicate that a $1.00 increase in the weekly maximum benefit results in
.006 fewer deaths per 100,000 workers, we can compute the portion of the total per week
wage savings generated by risk reductions. The structural weekly wage equation estimates
(Table 3, Column 1) indicate that one additional death per 100,000 workers results in
a weekly wage increase of $1.31.20 Thus, a $10.00 increase in benefits, which lowers the

death rate by .06, causes weekly wages to fall by $.08 (($1.31)(.06)), or about $5.00 per
worker annually in 1988 prices. This effect equals about one-tenth of the direct effect of
benefits on wages, which equals $ 1.10 per week. Thus, compared to the direct effect, this
indirect effect is relatively unimportant.
One implication of these results is that safety expenditures induced by the benefit hikes
are self-financed in part through wage reductions. To get an idea of the magnitude of the
savings generated by risk reductions in 1982, the year covered by our sample, consider the
effect of a 10% increase in the benefit maximum, which corresponds roughly to annual
growth rates in workers' compensation premiums for the years 1977-1983.21 At the mean
value of WCMAX in our sample ($240.00), the implied increase of $24.00 would lower
the death rate by .14, with a resulting decline in weekly wages of $.20 (($1.31)(.14)), or
about $10.00 annually ($12.00 in 1988 prices). This figure, which measures the safety
incentive effects of workers' compensation acting as an injury tax, dwarfs the OSHA fines
per worker for the period of about $.50 per year. The $12.00 per worker wage reduction
also equals approximately one-fifth the reported per worker expenditures on health and
safety for the year 1981 of $57.00, expressed in 1988 prices.22
In addition to the self-financing aspect of the risk reductions caused by workers' compensation increases, there is also a substantial direct wage saving generated by the benefit
increases. The direct effect of an increase in the benefit maximum equals approximately
$.107 in weekly wages per dollar of benefits. Thus, if a worker is earning $486.00 per week
(the mean in our sample) and is above the maximum, which equals, say, $240.00, a 10%
increase in WCMAX of $24.00 will cause weekly wages to fall by about $2.57, or about
$150.00 per year in 1988 prices.
A further implication of the estimated wage trade-off is that it can be used to estimate
the degree of risk aversion exhibited by workers in our sample. Our estimates imply that a
$2.40 increase in weekly benefits will reduce wages by $.20, or $ 10.00 per year. The expected
value to the worker of this $2.40 weekly benefit increase, using a fatality rate of 6.6 deaths
per 100,000 workers, 52 weeks worked, and 30 years of remaining life for the surviving
spouse, equals $.24. Thus, the ratio of the cost to the expected benefit is quite high, as the
cost exceeds the benefit by a factor of about forty. Based on this, one might conclude that
the trade-off suggests extreme risk aversion. However, this large observed wage trade-off
might indicate instead that the effectivevalue of the benefit increasedepends on the likelihood
of any accident, not just fatalities. For example, using a nonfatal lost workday accident
frequency of 4.0 deaths per 100 workers, which is close to the national average for the
period and an average duration of 13 weeks, and assuming for simplicity that fatal and
nonfatal accident probabilities are independent, the expected value of the $2.40 benefit
increase equals about $1.50. Thus, workers give up $ 10.00 in annual wages for about $1.50
in expected benefits, which is much more plausible.
We do not have information on the changes in fatality insurance premiums per worker

208WAGE/8RISK= 5.20- (.0122 + .0040)(WCMAX) = $1.31.
See Price (1984).
22
Actual expenditures on employee safety and health in 1981 for all businesses, reported by McGraw-Hill
(1986), were $5,120.4 million. The total civilian labor force in 1981 included 107 million workers, as reported by
the council of Economic Advisers (1987). Safety expenditure data were taken from The McGraw-Hill Survey of
Investment in Employee Safety and Health (1986).
21
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that would arise due to a 10% increase in the benefit maximum. Therefore, we cannot
determine what portion of this increase is paid for out of wage reductions. In the absence
of benefits, annual wages would be $1,475.00 higher (in 1988 prices).23 By way of comparison, total compensation per year for fatality risks, assuming a mean death rate of 6.6
deaths per 100,000 workers, equals about $500.00 in our results.

8. Robustness

of the results

* Given the particularestimation strategyfollowed in this article, our resultsdo not appear
to be sensitive to the form of the dependent variable in the risk or the wage equations.
Furthermore, use of the before- or after-tax wage did not alter the results. The final specification issue (i.e., the robustness of our results to the specification and estimation approach
chosen) does not appearto be a problem either. For instance, instrumentalvariableestimates
reported in Moore and Viscusi (forthcoming) produce identical results in terms of sign and
statistical significance of the workers' compensation variables in both the risk and the wage
equations. We have also estimated a version of the model using the estimation strategy
developed by Biddle and Zarkin ( 1988); once again, the qualitative nature of our results
does not change.

9. Conclusion
* The workers' compensation program has not enjoyed the most favorable reputation.
In the past critics chargedthat benefit levels were not high enough to provide for full income
replacement. States increased benefits beginning in the 1970s, but this improvement evoked
cries of alarm regarding spiralling premium costs and abuses with respect to moral hazard
problems, such as false claims and overextended periods of recovery from illnesses.24
Although the moral hazard problems are important, workers' compensation also plays
a constructive role. The results presented in this article indicate that workplace fatalities
would increase in the absence of this program. Workers' compensation represents by far
the most influential governmental program for reducing workplace fatalities. This effectiveness suggests that if the current level of safety is considered too low, one might wish to
assess the degree to which some of OSHA's responsibilities could be shifted to an injury
tax approach.
Complaints voiced by firms with respectto escalatingworkers'compensation premiums
may be overstated, since they neglect the substantial wage offset resulting both from the
risk reduction induced by workers' compensation and the trade-off workers make between
ex post insurance compensation and ex ante wage compensation. However, even though
the net economic cost of workers' compensation to firms is considerably lower than the
premium level (due to these offsets), firms may not be irrational in their complaints about
rising premiums, since the costs of the marginal benefit increases are positive. (See Moore
and Viscusi (1989).)
The favorable evidence presented here with respect to the performance of workers'
compensation is not intended to lead observers to dismiss as unimportant the difficult
causality problems raised by health risks, the litigation problems raised by permanent disabilities, and the continuing moral hazard problems with respect to nonfatal injury claims
and their duration.25 Nevertheless, our results do suggest that workers' compensation is
more successful in promoting its intended objectives than was previously believed.
23
The weekly wage effect equals $.107 per dollar of benefits. Multiplying by WCMAX ($240.00) and by 50
weeks yields $1,280.00 per year, or about $1,475.00 in 1988 prices.
24
See, for example, Smith (1989), Butler and Worral(1985), Kniesner and Leeth (1989, 1988), and Krueger
(1988) for analyses of moral hazard problems.
25 For an excellent discussion of the agenda for workers' compensation reform, see Weiler
(1986).
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